My great-grandfather, Alexander Houck Mosier, served in WWI with the 79th Division during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, which took place from September 26, 1918, to November 11th, 1918. This is his story.

I have in my possession the transcription of a diary he wrote while deployed. A major help in writing this story is the book History of the Seventy-Ninth Division A.E.F. during the World War: 1917-1919, published in 1922. The book was extremely helpful, as Alexander had trouble spelling the French names. Reading along helped me to narrow down the towns he traveled through. I also have created a google map (https://www.google.com/maps/d/edit?mid=1Q49-SJTkOTM5jPSWg-qH7cAeFjOtm68&usp=drive_link ) , which plots where I think he was. Especially in later parts where his division is in combat, the pins mark the general area. The map covers his whole diary, so minor spoilers for where he traveled.

In this story, I have picked specific entries from his diary, marked in bold, to tell the story, with my comments/ summary along with quotes from the book, in italics. There are entries for each day, but some are removed to shorten the length of the story.

This story is continued from PART 2, Preparing to Attack.

Thursday - 26 September - Got up early. Over the top for hours. Tired and hungry. Stayed in shell holes at night.

At 5h 30 — the long awaited "H" hour — the fury of the artillery preparation was concentrated, for twenty-five minutes as prearranged, on the enemy front line." Under this crescendo of fire, the men of the advance companies of the 313th and 314th Infantry, with fixed bayonets, "jumped off" for the attack, each company maintaining a distance of ten to fifteen meters between each man.'" At the same moment, all up and down the Meuse-Argonne front, the shock companies of eight other divisions surged forward.

Like stated above, the barrage was to roll forward, covering the infantry. But the dense underbrush and old shell holes slowed the American advance enough to where their artillery cover was far ahead of them.

At some point, the 313th reached a well-defended clearing and were pinned down for five hours, under intense machine gun and sniper fire. Multiple frontal assaults were repulsed with heavy losses.

At this point the Bois de Malancourt opened suddenly into a clearing, known on the military maps as the Golfe de Malancourt This clearing, nearly a mile wide and something less than that in depth, resembled nothing so much as a triangular rent in the woods from right, to left.

It was this position, defended to its fullest possibilities by the enemy, that held up the 313th Infantry for nearly five hours and effectively checked the capture of Montfaucon, as planned, on the first day of the attack. It resisted numerous frontal attacks of the most determined sort, not only by the two front line companies but by additional companies of the front line battalions as they came up. It was simply an impossibility for men in any numbers to survive the machine gun fire that the slightest or most carefully concealed sortie from the woods brought forth. And the few who did get across some part of the open ground lost their lives in, or were checked by, the barbed-wire entanglements.

By early afternoon other divisions had started to outflank the German defenders in front of the 313th. With some more infantry support, the 313th took the German positions on the edge of the clearing and advanced.

At 16:00, the commanding officer of the 313th called for a halt and to reorganize, as the forward elements were being strafed by the defenders of Mountfaucon.

An attempt was made to organize an attack on the town ahead, but with darkness falling there wasn’t enough time. Some officers believed the town could have been taken that night.

Friday - 27 September - Rainy. Started to take town. Went through and forced to retreat and started again with heavy losses. Forced to dig in at night and morning return to town. I shot an airplane with rifle. Got in a shell hole with Lt. Johnson. Name of town, Montfaucon.

It took some time to find the elements of the 313th and the 314th before the attack could continue. At 07:00, the two Regiments left the relative safety of the woods and attacked the town.

The whole approach to Montfaucon and the Bois de la Tuilerie, which lay immediately east of the town, was an open plain, inclining upward. It offered no places of concealment, save an occasional bush here and there on the slope, and it was plotted for enfilading fire from the northern edge of the Bois de Cuisy clear to the outskirts of the defenses on the hilltop. Because of its elevation it stood out, clearly discernible for miles around, and the enemy artillery from two points could sweep it by direct fire, observing the effect of every shell.

Despite the open ground, the Americans swiftly took the town with low casualties. Colonel Sweezey (regimental commander) sent a message at 12:45 with news that they had captured the town.

The injuries of the pigeon that delivered the message describe the intensity of the artillery: The bird arrived at the pigeon loft, just outside of Jouy-en-Argonne, "with its left wing torn and bleeding, evidently caused by shrapnel, after having struggled through a heavy artillery fire, covering the distance of about fourteen miles in one hour and forty-three minutes.

The 313th took the old German command post under heavy artillery fire and pushed into the fields north, where they encountered a fierce resistance.

By nightfall, with the men exhausted, supporting tanks damaged or destroyed, Colonel Sweezey ordered a halt. The regiment dug in just outside the town.

The men in the advance lines were still without water and had, in almost all instances, exhausted the rations they had carried in their packs at the opening of the drive.

The book remarks that despite the severity of the fighting, overall there were light casualties.

Saturday - 28 September - Went out good head way, passed one objective but met with heavy losses by shrapnel and machine gun fire. Nothing to eat. Slept in woods, Seen several airplanes, both of them French and American.

“The high command had failed to take into consideration the strength of the German defenses. The terrific fighting of the first two days demonstrated clearly enough to G. H. Q. that there had been an error made somewhere in determining the enemy resisting power. That error seems to have been committed elsewhere on the extended battle front as well. Only on the extreme right had it been possible, in the first two days of the drive, to reach the given objectives.

On the night of the 27th, Major General Kuhn decided to withdraw the 313th and 314th for the reserve regiments, as "to afford these regiments a chance to obtain food and water, which they had not received since September 26th, and to obtain some slight rest after their exertions."

As the men left the front line, they came under heavy artillery fire.

It’s unclear where the 313th went after they left the front line, as a report from another commander has some of the 313th pinned down in woods to the north. It doesn’t appear that any of the 313th got their food, as supply teams were still below Mountfaucon.

The 313th and the 314th were savaged by artillery fire and had to clear out machine gun nests that had been passed in the first wave of the day’s attack.

The book gives this grim description of the battlefield as night fell.

The rainfall had continued steadily, gradually turning the ground into mire, the shell holes into muddy lakes. Occasional sweeps of enemy machine gun fire added to the horror of the night. Officers and men, clinging to what shelter they could secure in the lee of "Suicide Hill" on the right, and in the fringes of Bois 268 on the left, were soaked to the skin. There could be no rest in this dismal, swamplike existence under ordinary conditions, and certainly none with the German artillery pounding and pounding upon the entire area. Shrapnel and high explosives burst in front, in the rear, overhead and in their midst. The troops crouched in the shallow, water-filled shell-holes, hoping to escape a direct hit, listening to the wicked roar of the avalanche of shell, trying to stop their ears to the piteous moans of the wounded, many of whom had not been and could not be evacuated. A great gnawing hunger had seized upon the men and could not be appeased. Only a few carrying details passed through to the advance battalions with food, being the first rations received since the jump off. The rain of steel kept supply trains and rolling kitchens from venturing near. Over all was the impenetrable darkness of a stormy night, no man seeing more than a yard before his face, knowing only by the breathing that his comrades were near.

Sunday, 29 September – Reformed and started again. Met heavy fire, forced again to retreat. Dug in until artillery fire started barrage then advanced until met by heavy artillery fire. Also our Company Commander killed. Withdrew and dug in again. Was fed by kitchen and stayed all night on tank blown up.

On the 29th, the 313th was ordered up to a wooded area called the Bois de Beuge or Bois 268 west of the small town of Nantillois to relieve the 316th infantry, which had been nearly destroyed and could only muster a single battalion. The goal was to push north to the next set of woods, Bois 250 where a platoon of the 316th was holding on against severe fire.

The 313th and 316th made multiple attacks and counterattacks, eventually pushing into Bois 250 with severe casualties. Orders were sent to withdraw back to the Bois De Beuge as night started to fall, the other regiments too exhausted to keep going. Major General Kuhn sent this message at 19:30 to the commander of the Fifth Corps.

I am informed that my telephone message to you regarding the situation of the 79th Division which was relayed through two intermediate stations, reached your headquarters about 16R 30 today. I am not sure that you have in fact received this message. I therefore deem it my duty to inform you by an orderly officer that the remaining troops of the 79th Division have "been ordered, to take up a holding position along the northern edge of the Bois de Beuge and in front of NANTILLOIS. Due to casualties and straggling, the effective force now available for holding this position is less than 50% of the original strength of the command. All of these troops are completely exhausted and incapable of effective action. They have been under a terrific shell fire, mixed with gas, for more than 24 hours. They have twice attempted to advance and capture the BOIS de QUONS. Both times they were driven back by artillery fire from the front and flanks, principally the right, and from combined machine gun fire. The tanks co-operated in the first attack towards the MADELIIIJE PABM, losing three. In yesterday's attack nine tanks were lost at the same point. The command has been on very short rations since the beginning of the advance and has suffered greatly from lack of water, which it has been impossible to supply during the last 36 hours because of the artillery fire before mentioned, I am informed that a somewhat similar situation exists on my right and left. It is my opinion that no advance by infantry is possible until effective counter battery work has been instituted. It has been impossible for the divisional artillery to cope with the situation. I deem it my duty to bring these matters to your attention in order that proper action may be taken in the premises. Identification of prisoners show that the Fifth Bavarian Reserve Division is now on our right.

Monday - 30 September - All that were left held lines. Rest of us got relief. Cold, rainy and clothes soaking wet. Was relieved by the 3™ Division and started the rear march until late and sleep on ground.

Command ordered that the 3rd Division would relieve the 79th division and that in view of the planned relief, there would be no attack on the 30th.

The mere holding of this line was a trying ordeal. The American artillery still seemed unable to neutralize the German fire, and the defensive line, shallow trenches and shell holes along the front of the Bois de Beuge and Nantillois, were shelled incessantly. The line was held with the heavy Brownings of the 311th and 312th Machine Gun Battalions and of two platoons of Company "B", 310th Machine Gun Battalion, in constant support. The enemy made no attempt to attack, being content to harass the lines and the back areas as much as possible by shell fire. In the meanwhile, carrying details got food forward at last to the men in the holding companies, and the 315th and 316th in reserve had their first substantial meal in four days.

By 13:00, the 3rd Division had arrived and relieved most of the 79th Division.

The "thin columns of exhausted men" stumbled back through Montfaucon, the heavy shelling still continuing and casualties occuring not infrequently. The haggard troops were bivouaced during the night of September 30 — October 1 in the vicinity of Malancourt. Exhausted, they slept that night for the first time since the opening of the drive with no fear of artillery, or machine gun, or gas.

Tuesday - 1 October - Walked nearly all day. Met lots of troops going to the front. Roads were crowded with trucks and wagons, very muddy road. Very cold at night.

Alexander and the 313th returned to the Bois de Lambechamp, where they had encamped on the 25-26th.

Wednesday - 2 October - Had roll call in woods to find dead and wounded. Detail on rations 2 1/2 kil.

The Division's record, in its first battle experience, is well reviewed by Major General Kuhn in the conclusions to the official Report of Operations of the Division in the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. He states:

"The Seventy-ninth Division came under fire for the first time since its organization. More than half of its strength was made up of draftees of not more than four months 'service, and considerably less of actual training, due to the time lost in transport from United States and in moving about while in France. So far as courage and self-sacrifice are concerned, the conduct of both officers and men was above all reproach, but, as is the case with all green troops, there was lacking the experience which comes only from actual contact with the enemy. In view of the difficulties of the terrain and the inexperiences of the troops, I am of the opinion that both officers and men fought well."

The 79th Division had lost 22 officers and 278 enlisted men in action, 86 officers and 2,228 men wounded or gassed, and 749 men were MIA, many found later to have been KIA.