An American privateer captures a British vessel in the War of 1812 WASHINGTON: Cyber bounty hunters waging “active defense” of critical infrastructure (CI) is only one among a number of explosive ideas in a new Atlantic Council study by two former DoD officials. Because the US government does not have enough capacity to defend the nation’s networks — despite recent efforts to beef up the authorities and capabilities of the military’s Cyber Command — the study proposes the deputization of private sector “actors” (read: hackers) as “certified active defenders.” These would be “private-sector entities with high cyber capabilities who will work under government direction and control,” the study explains. A loose analogy is privateers in the age of sail: “The Constitution provides for ‘letters of marque,’ and certified active defenders … would be a modern version,” the study says, except with a “focus on defense and resilience” and, unlike privateers, under government control. The concept is only one among many contained in the new report by Frank Kramer, assistant secretary for international security affairs in the Clinton administration, and Bob Butler, deputy assistant secretary for space and cyber under Obama. The authors are advocating for a new framework for US cybersecurity based heavily on DoD’s 2018 Cyber Strategy — only expanded to include the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Treasury, the FBI, the Intelligence Community and the State Department. That includes bringing the “defend forward” and “attack support” concepts to the protection of civil CI in certain key sectors. This more aggressive US government-led approach is needed, they argue, because the main threat to CI today are adversary nation-states, not criminals — that the private sector cannot be expected to defense against on their own. The proposed framework, laid out in “Cybersecurity: Changing the Model,” would create a National Cybersecurity Fusion Center to “organize multiagency programmatic and operational aspects of support to key critical infrastructure. Kramer and Butler single out eight “critical infrastructure and key resources” that they believe require stronger government intervention to protect and should be the focus on the center’s activities: “energy, especially the electric grid, and oil and gas pipelines; finance; telecommunications; transportation, particularly air, rail and maritime; and water and wastewater treatment.” If disrupted, these functions “could have significant cascading effects on the economy,” the study explains. The new Fusion Center, which might be virtual rather than “bricks and mortar” Kramer told me, would have to power to mandate that certain critical infrastructure sectors use specific “highly effective cyber technologies and techniques.” It would also be the body licensing “certified active defenders,” i.e. private-sector entities with high cyber capabilities who will work under government direction and control.” Needless to say, the study has raised eyebrows among experts with experience in cyber defense at US agencies and in academe. One former DoD cyber official exclaimed: “Bounty hunters to bring back proof and get a prize!? This is like extending the Second Amendment for ‘certified acting defenders’ to act on private networks. Where is the legal authority?” Critical infrastructure sectors Another former US government cybersecurity expert said that approving intrusions on foreign networks by private actors was dangerous, even if they didn’t actually “break anything” while they were there. “With the ‘defending forward’ strategy, DoD means you hack your way into (adversary) networks and simply investigate, but you are physically there so you can do something when there is a trigger. This is still intruding in their network.” Allowing private actors to do this could create serious instability between countries,” this expert said, especially if the network being penetrated was actually one owned by a US ally that had unfortunately been compromised by a potential adversary like Russia or China. For their part, Kramer and Butler stress that they are not talking about giving these deputized “defenders” offensive powers — “we are not advocating the right to hack back,” Kramer explained — but rather to take on “active defense.” They also acknowledge that there is a fine line between active defense and offense, and noted that the key would be government control via authorities that would have to be provided by Congress. Indeed, Kramer and Butler acknowledge that many pieces of their proposal, which they explain uses a “nested approach” to challenges at the private sector, state and local, national and international levels, will require changes to a number of legal authorities and direct action by Congress. In fact, the report, has an entire section outlining what Congress should do. “This is a framework document, not an operational one,” said Kramer. “We want to open a dialogue.” Charles Harry, Director of Operations at the University of Maryland’s Maryland Global Initiative in Cybersecurity (MaGIC), who spent 14 years at the National Security Agency, said that while “what they’re proposing is one option, my personal feeling is that we are not going to be safer by going more on the offense. Instead, the real issue is resiliency. The key is figuring out how we can better understand systemic and organizational risk in order to better devote resources to CI, and minimize impacts so that any system is back up in a half hour or 45 minutes.” Finally, one has to wonder how such an aggressive approach would fit with current US cyber policy and strategy writ large — given that the Trump administration has put a strong emphasis on working with allies to establish cyber norms of behavior. Indeed, even if only confined to DoD actions, the “defend forward” strategy conflicts with a cooperative normative approach, as it would see DoD undertaking exactly the kind of cyber probing that the US has chided Russia and China for. That inherent conflict, one expert said, is something the Trump administration doesn’t seem to have yet internalized.
WASHINGTON: The Trump administration is wooing a broad coalition of “like-minded” nations to join a US-led “deterrence initiative” that includes collective response to malicious cyber activities by China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, says Robert Strayer, deputy assistant secretary of state for cyber and international communications and information policy. “If we don’t stand together to defend our vision and values online, they will continue to be undermined,” he told the Atlantic Council’s annual cyber engagement conference yesterday. This may be harder to do than Washington thinks, however. While most of the so-called Five Eyes allies (those with which the US shares high-level intelligence) express support for the idea of cooperation on “norms enforcement,” other countries are more skeptical. For example, Singapore cyber czar David Koh instead called for the major powers to work harder to reach consensus about how to implement norms and the “rule of law” in cyberspace. He chided: “A world where right makes right spells disaster for us and other small countries, maybe even middle powers.” He added, “We have a saying in Asia: when the elephants fight, the ants get smashed.” Strayer explained that Washington wants to “build coalition of like-minded nations not just to impose attribution” (that is, name and shame bad actors) but also to ‘do’ consequences together. He noted that sanctions imposed on bad actors are much stronger if there is a large coalition behind them, rather than if imposed by a single country. In the September 2018 National Cyber Strategy, the Trump administration recognized that it’s “not enough just to have norms,” Strayer said, but that nations need to be held accountable for actions that violate those norms. The administration is trying to convince allies and friendly nations to engage in collective response in order to “establish the legitimacy” of those norms. Christopher Painter, cyber czar at the State Department under Obama, agrees on the need for states to respond to norms violations. “I agree we need to do it, or we embolden (bad actors) to do more — creating a norm, if you will, of inaction,” he told me. “I also think it is better to do this collectively with other countries. It’s more powerful and has more legitimacy despite the difficulties getting coalitions of countries to act.” Strayer and his Western colleagues speaking at the conference panel on “Enforcing Norms” agreed that the set of norms agreed in 2015 by the UN Group of Governmental Experts on cybersecurity issues form a baseline normative regime that can, and should, be enforced. The problem, they said, is that certain nations (read Strayer’s list) are now “walking back” from those commitments. Timo Koster, Netherlands ambassador-at-large for security policy & cyber, said his country had come to the conclusion that “soft tools are not enough to influence state behavior.” Rather, he said, some framework is needed to “both overtly and covertly react to malicious behavior by attribution and naming and shaming.” That said, he cautioned that the strong US focus on deterrence “is a little bit premature.” He stressed that there needs to be a continuum of response to malicious cyber intrusions that includes everything from ensuring resiliency to diplomacy. Koster’s remarks reflect the fact that NATO has yet to really nail down its agreed response to even serious cyber attacks, as colleague Sydney has reported in detail. Manon Le Blanc, senior policy officer for cyber at the European External Action Service (the EU’s foreign service), likewise said that the European Union’s response framework includes a broad array of potential reactions to negative cyber behavior. Thus, she explained, the EU would not always seek to “impose costs” on norm breakers; rather the “diplomatic toolkit” includes “talks about normative behavior” with violators in hopes of changing minds. Koh, however, veered from the Western consensus slightly to suggest that the high-level norms agreed so far are simply not detailed enough, and called for more work at the UN to establish a global understanding of the “rule of law” for the cybersphere. However, he acknowledged that the application of international law to the cyber domain is controversial — so he recommended that nations need to work together to “build common understanding” of the rules of the road and then build the “technical capacity to implement them.” As an aside, discerning readers might ponder the US call to arms for publicly chastising norm breakers in the cyber domain in the light of Washington’s conspicuous silence following India’s norm-busting March 27 anti-satellite weapons test. Is the Trump administration signaling that there should to be one ‘likeminded’ reaction to norms violations by US adversaries, and another for allies and friends? Maybe the cyber and space policy gurus aren’t communicating? Or perhaps consistency is just the hobgoblin of little minds.