When I studied politics in London, one of my lecturers was a fellow named Neil Kinnock, a Welshman who went on to lead the Labour Party. Kinnock, though he loved Wales and clearly understood the pride his countrymen took in their little patch, never joined the then-dominant Welsh nationalist group, Plaid Cymru. Kinnock knew being part of a larger country offered both him and his countrymen better opportunities. So it should be for Scotland, due to vote on an independence plebiscite on Sept. 18. Shrinking their country will impose enormous costs on them as they struggle to build a currency, national ministries and, yes, a military, Oil will help, but how many countries do we all know who have had oil and haven’t turned out all that well? OK, there’s Norway, but… Scotland’s overall influence will shrink because its economy, population and military will all be smaller than those of the United Kingdom. But the vote may go in favor of independence and we offer this intriguing commentary about why the United States should support Scotland’s inevitable application for NATO membership, should the vote be aye. The Editor.

As NATO leaders met in Wales last week, the obvious topics dominated the discussion – NATO’s relationship to an increasingly aggressive Russia and the need to destroy ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

But another issue was overlooked: the prospect of an independent Scotland joining NATO. If Scots vote for independence on September 18, the United States should lead the way in supporting Scotland as a NATO member state.

At least one recent poll shows support for independence greater than 50 percent, with less than two weeks to go before the referendum. What was once seen as a nationalist pipe dream now appears to be a plausible scenario. Unfortunately, the debate in Scotland has turned increasingly bitter in recent weeks, and even common sense positions that reassure current UK allies – like the Scottish Government’s plan to remain in NATO after independence – have been viciously attacked as unrealistic and baseless.

On the surface, these claims seem to make sense. The argument goes that the current Scottish Government has pledged to remove the UK’s Trident program from Scottish waters as quickly and safely as possible after independence, and to then enshrine a ban of nuclear weapons in the new country’s constitution. While no official UK backup plan exists, Malcolm Chalmers from the Royal United Services Institute argues that the four Vanguard Submarines that power the UK Trident Program can be moved to Devonport off the south-west English coast, ensuring that Britain’s nuclear deterrent remains strategically effective. While this will be relatively painless, creating a new weapons facility to mirror RNAD Coulport will take much more time. Nonetheless, removing Trident is seen as a feasible option by virtually all experts and likely will happen if Scots vote for independence. So how would NATO – especially its chief funder, the United States – allow a state that removed nuclear weapons to join a nuclear weapons-based alliance? Indeed, this is a logical argument, but one that is deeply flawed.

A vast majority – 25 of the 28 – NATO member states do not have their own nuclear arsenal. Only the US, UK and France possess nuclear weapons capabilities. However, I give some credence to the point that an explicit Scottish ban of nuclear weapons on its territory could prove difficult for NATO membership. But this should not be a nail in the coffin for Scotland’s attempts to join the alliance.

Dame Mariot Leslie, a Scot, was the UK’s Ambassador to NATO until she retired earlier this year. In a recent letter, she made it clear that an independent Scotland’s desire to join NATO will be in the best interest of every member of the alliance. Ambassador Leslie dismisses the claims of independence opponents who have repeatedly stated that Scotland would have to wait in line while the alliance determines whether Ukraine and Georgia should join. Noting that there is no “queuing order” for NATO membership and that each candidature request is considered separately, she writes that she is 100 percent confident that “the other 28 NATO allies [including the United States] would see it in their interests to welcome an independent Scotland into NATO.”

Moreover, the idea that the United States would allow large swaths of the North Sea – a crucial geopolitical deterrent to Russia – to leave its sphere of influence is ludicrous. After all, the Scottish Government has plans to model its conventional defense forces after Norway, a NATO country also with vast territory in the North Sea. If Iceland can be a NATO member state north of Scotland even though it has no standing army, it is difficult to imagine Scotland being rejected by the NATO alliance.

I accept that Scotland’s situation will be unique since no other NATO member state has explicitly banned nuclear weapons from its territory. This position might have to change in order to secure NATO membership, although that is certainly not definitive. And if NATO were to demand the removal of the nuclear ban proposal to guarantee membership, the Scots should take the offer.

This trade-off would secure the best of both worlds – Scotland secure under the NATO alliance while still being able to remove current Trident nuclear weapons from its waters, and NATO keeping its strategic edge in the crucial geopolitical position of the North Sea. Scotland undoubtedly needs NATO membership to guarantee that its defense forces have a global stature and receive additional security from its allies. But NATO also needs Scotland, because letting go of a large portion of the North Sea would be detrimental to all current and future member states. It is thus imperative that the United States recognize an independent Scotland’s utility to NATO and argue for Scots to remain in the alliance alongside Scottish leaders. Scots might not be able to convince all 28 states to let them join, but the United States certainly can.

James McKeon is a Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the Stimson Center. Before joining Stimson, he worked as an intern at the White House and as a member of staff for the Scottish National Party at the UK Parliament.