The Castle Bravo nuclear test in the Bikini Atoll

As President Trump prepares to meet Vladimir Putin in a high-stakes one-on-one meeting, there is growing and legitimate concern in Washington and European capitals about concessions Trump might make in the hopes of getting along with the Russian strongman.

The anxiety is warranted, given President Trump’s public statements on NATO and the invasion of Ukraine, as well as his dismissal of Russian election interference. There is, however, a possible US-Russian compromise that should be welcomed and encouraged: the extension of the landmark New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START.

Yes, relations between the United States and Russia have deteriorated significantly in recent years, with contacts cut off at many levels. Nevertheless, the two countries still have to talk about a basic, life-or-death reality: They possess between them over 90 percent of the roughly 15,000 nuclear weapons on the planet, and each presents an existential threat to the other. Given that grim fact, leaders in Washington and Moscow have a special responsibility to avoid direct conflict and reduce nuclear threats.

Acknowledging that truth, President Trump told reporters on March 20 that he’d like to meet with Putin “to discuss the arms race, which is getting out of control.” Both the United States and Russia are spending massive sums to upgrade their Cold War-era arsenals and develop new types of weapons.

In this context, talking about New START makes sense. It is one of the few remaining bright spots in the US-Russia relationship. Signed in 2010, the treaty requires the United States and Russia each to reduce strategic nuclear forces to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads, 700 deployed long-range missiles and bombers, and 800 deployed and non-deployed missile launchers and bombers by Feb. 5, 2018 — a deadline that both countries met.

New START also includes a comprehensive suite of monitoring and verification provisions to help ensure compliance — but the agreement will expire on Feb. 5, 2021. Under its terms, it can be extended by up to five years without further approval by the US Senate or Russian Duma if both presidents agree.

Extension of the treaty should be a no-brainer from both a security and an economic perspective. In March 2017, Gen. John Hyten, who leads US Strategic Command, told Congress that “bilateral, verifiable arms control agreements are essential to our ability to provide an effective deterrent.” New START monitoring provides real-time insights directly into Russian strategic forces – insights that cannot be gained in any other way. Further, the verifiable caps aid U.S. military planning by reducing the need to make worst-case assessments that could prompt additional costly nuclear force investments. Washington is already planning to spend at least $1.7 trillion to sustain and upgrade the current arsenal, which is based on the New START limits, over the next three decades.

If the treaty is allowed to lapse, there will be no limits on Russia’s strategic nuclear forces for the first time since the early-1970s. Even more dangerous is the fact that other arms control guardrails are in danger of collapsing. The United States determined that Russia is in violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Heading off the risk of unconstrained and wildly expensive US-Russia nuclear competition demands maintenance of the one bilateral nuclear agreement that is actually working.

While the benefits of extending New START are manifest, obstacles remain. National Security Advisor John Bolton has long castigated the agreement, calling it “unilateral disarmament” and “an execrable deal.” In reality, the treaty places equal limits on both sides that provide mutual benefit. Trump’s Secretaries of Defense and State appear to agree, as they both support the treaty.

Other Republican critics of New START argue that it should not be extended so long as Russia is violating other arms control agreements and developing new weapons, such as those unveiled by Putin in a speech last spring. But Russia’s development of new strategic systems actually reinforces the case for extending New START. The agreement provides for discussion and possible limitation of emerging strategic offensive arms. If Russia moves forward on any of these systems, the United States should insist on relevant discussions in the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the treaty’s implementing body.

But New START extension should never be used as a bargaining chip because it is too important to be gambled away. If the treaty disappears in 2021, Russia would be free to expand the number of strategic nuclear weapons pointed directly at the United States.

Unfortunately, the biggest obstacle to extension might be Trump himself. He has denounced New START as another bad deal negotiated by his predecessor, like the Iran deal that he recently upended. As Trump prepares for his meeting with Putin, he should be reminded that the treaty provides the predictability that our military leaders want, the transparency that our intelligence community needs, and the stability that our allies deserve.

Agreeing to extend New START would be an easy win for Trump and the United States. By doing so he would be building on the arms control legacy of President Reagan. And it would allow him to claim, on the grandest of stages in Helsinki, that he struck a great deal to meaningfully reduce the nuclear threat.

Alexandra Bell is the Senior Policy Director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. She previously served as the Director for Strategic Outreach in the Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the Department of State. Kingston Reif is the Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association.